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ABSTRACT 
The U.S. Navy recently designated Humanitarian Assistance (HA) and Disaster 
Relief (DR) as core capabilities, recognizing the importance of delivering a potent 
strategic communications message directly to foreign populations.  The Ship-to-Shore 
Transportation Problem (SSTP) refers to the daily need to determine transportation asset 
(embarked helicopters, watercraft, and ground vehicles) routing and loading to effect the 
movement of personnel and patients between Hospital Ship (T-AH) and ashore mission 
sites during HA/DR operations.  The SSTP significantly impacts overall mission 
performance.  The SSTP is formulated as a mixed-integer mathematical optimization 
model, minimizing cost in a multi-objective merit function reflecting mission 
performance, personnel strength and transportation asset utilization while reflecting 
constraints unique to T-AH HA (flight deck limitations, restricted embarkation and 
debarkation by watercraft).  Optimized schedules improve average duration of ashore 
mission site operations by between 9% and 13% compared to a set of optimistic, pseudo-
manually generated schedules, and decrease average time spent by personnel in transit by 
between 16% and 43%.  USNS COMFORT (T-AH 20) treated nearly 95,000 patients in 
2007 during an HA deployment; operational efficiencies can translate into thousands 
more benefiting from HA.  This thesis also helps allocate helicopter flight hours, a 
monthly constraint, over a set of daily SSTP scenarios.   
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The U.S. Navy recently designated Humanitarian Assistance (HA) and Disaster 
Relief (DR) as core capabilities.  The value of HA/DR, putting aside obvious moral 
imperatives, is that it delivers a potent strategic communications message directly to 
foreign populations.    
HA and DR operations, as relatively new competencies for Naval forces, have yet 
to benefit from the same degree of robust analysis underlying high performance in other 
core capability areas.  The two hospital ships in current inventory, USNS MERCY (T-
AH 19) and USNS COMFORT (T-AH 20), have been, and will likely continue to be, 
centerpiece platforms for Naval HA. The researcher, while participating in a recent HA 
operation aboard USNS COMFORT, observed and assessed a range of operational 
problems affecting HA performance.  Many of these challenging problems would likely 
benefit from operations research analysis, particularly mathematical optimization, to help 
elevate mission performance to a level commensurate with core capability status.   
Among these problems, we define the Ship-to-Shore Transportation Problem 
(SSTP) as the daily need to determine transportation asset (embarked helicopters, 
watercraft, and ground vehicles) routing and loading to effect the movement of personnel 
and patients between ship and ashore mission site.  The SSTP manifests when the T-AH 
is not able to moor pier-side, a common occurrence in T-AH HA operations due to the 
ship’s draft and port limitations in developing countries.     
Solutions to the SSTP, optimal or otherwise, significantly impact overall mission 
performance by affecting ashore mission site operation time, itself a critical constraint on 
the number of patients treated during the HA operation.  With most patients receiving 
treatment ashore where operations are limited to daylight hours, time is critical.  Further, 
time personnel spend in transit comes at the expense of their contribution to operations or 
ability to deal with fatigue by resting, and by extension, their proficiency given the 
arduous workday.    
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The SSTP is formulated as a mixed-integer mathematical optimization model, the 
T-AH HA Transportation (T-AH HAT) model. It seeks to minimize a multi-objective 
merit function reflecting: (a) the degradation in mission performance occurring when 
personnel are not at their assigned mission sites during potential operational hours; (b) 
the degradation in personnel strength occurring as a function of time spent in transit or 
idle awaiting transportation; and, (c) the fixed and variable costs of transportation asset 
utilization. 
The SSTP decision maker employing the T-AH HAT model is afforded the 
opportunity to weight the various objective function elements in keeping with their 
assessment of priorities.  Given input criteria, the model produces an optimal plan for 
ship-to-shore movement, assigning passengers to vehicles and scheduling vehicle 
movement.   The model reflects unique constraints such as limitations on T-AH flight 
deck utilization, and on embarkation and debarkation of personnel between T-AH and 
watercraft.  The T-AH HAT model is implemented in Xpress-MP, with a supporting MS-
Access database.   
Our optimized schedules improve average duration of ashore mission site 
operations by between 9% and 13% compared to a set of pseudo-manually generated 
schedules (which appear generous compared to the actual manual schedules produced 
during recent operations).  Over the course of an HA deployment, even minor efficiencies 
can translate into thousands of additional patients receiving medical care (e.g., 
COMFORT treated nearly 95,000 in 2007).  Simultaneously, we are able to decrease 
average time spent by personnel in transit by between 16% and 43%.       
Besides the single-day SSTP, this thesis devises an approximating algorithm to 
accommodate the allocation of a pre-specified number of helicopter flight hours, a 
monthly constraint, over a set of daily T-AH HAT mission scheduling problems.  The 
utility of allocating flight hours among daily problems by this algorithm, instead of on a 
pro-rata or other arbitrary basis, is that flight hours are assigned based on where they will 
have the greatest impact in improving aggregate objective function value across the set of 
daily problems.  For example, a set of T-AH HAT optimized schedules employing this 
algorithm improves, among other criteria, the number of fully manned mission site 
 xv
operational hours by an additional 3% (on top off initial optimization gains) relative to 
optimized schedules employing the same gross number of flight hours but without 
reallocation between the individual problems.  
The T-AH HAT model also promises to serve as an analytical tool in determining 
the impact on mission performance criteria of providing additional transportation 
capability to the T-AH.  In preliminary analysis over three notional operating scenarios, 
the certification of a second flight deck helicopter landing spot was found to increase 
ashore mission site operating hours by 4%, while the addition of two high-capacity 
watercraft to the T-AH improved ashore mission site operating hours by 10%, both with 
regards to already optimized schedules.     
The availability of the T-AH HAT model and implementation has been advertised 
to decision makers associated with an upcoming HA deployment of USNS MERCY (T-
AH 19) in mid-2008, thus far with positive response from COMPACFLT personnel.  
Efforts to field the model and implementation aboard MERCY are ongoing.  Thesis 
results are being shared with Mr. J. Zarkowsky, Director, Future Deployable Platforms at 
the Bureau of Medicine (Navy), and have been briefed to Mr. J. Kaskin, Director, 
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A. UNITED STATES NAVY HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE 
USNS COMFORT (T-AH 20) commenced a four-month Humanitarian 
Assistance deployment to Central and South America on 15 June 2007 amid great 
fanfare, rating a White House press release and multiple public statements from President 
Bush in the weeks preceding and following the hospital ship’s departure [The White 
House, 2007].  As of this writing, COMFORT’s 2007 deployment is the latest in a series 
of Humanitarian Assistance (HA) and Disaster Relief (DR) operations which have proven 
to be operationally complex endeavors of significant strategic value.1   
U.S. Navy HA and DR deployments in support Tsunami relief in 2005, and a 
subsequent HA deployment of USNS MERCY (T-AH 19) to Indonesia and neighboring 
countries in 2006, saved and bettered thousands of lives, effectively delivering a strategic 
communications message from the U.S. directly to foreign populations.  These operations 
have also been unique in their inclusion of Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) 
partners.  It has been noted hospital ships may be viewed as offensive participants in the 
so-called Global War on Terrorism “by supporting U.S. public information and public 
diplomacy efforts through direct and highly visible contact with individuals we may wish 
to influence” [McGrady, 2006]. 
The recently released strategic document “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st 
Century Seapower” elevates HA to ‘core capability’ status for the U.S. Navy, placing it 
among traditional roles, such as Power Projection and Sea Control, that collectively 
“comprise the core of U.S. maritime power” [Allen et.al., 2007].  The document also 
specifies that the expeditionary character of maritime forces places the Navy in a unique 
position among interagency and multinational HA and DR practitioners.  This establishes 
                                                 
1 The terms HA and DR are commonly used in conjunction, as in ‘HA/DR’, although deliberate HA 
operations may take place without regard to any specific disaster.  COMFORT’s 2007 deployment was an 
instance of deliberate HA, however, there was an intended DR training and preparedness element to the 
mission, recognizing the operational similarities between the two.  While this thesis will focus on 
optimizing a process found in HA operations, results will be strongly applicable to DR.      
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two things: First, the Navy has a defined interest in HA; Second, the Navy recognizes 
there is an expectation it will bring the capabilities associated with expeditionary 
operations – robust planning, agility, communications capability and logistical might – to 
highly visible international HA efforts.   
This performance expectation is particularly significant with regards to three 
groups: NGOs, host nation populations, and the media.  NGOs have high expectations 
when they work with the U.S. military.  In particular, they expect the military will bring 
capability and expertise in the very area NGOs find most constraining: logistics.  If 
NGOs participate in a military operation and do not find the expected logistics capability 
and expertise, they will be less likely to work with the military in the future and may 
question the government’s commitment to the operation.   
Host nation populations, once selected to receive HA, have high expectations of 
the capability and efficiency of the U.S. government, and by extension, the military.  The 
positive impact of successfully treating a host nation populace may be offset by the 
negative impact of unmet expectations, especially if the populace believes a lack of effort 
or operational efficiency on the part of HA providers is to blame for their disappointment.  
Perceptions by the populace of inefficient or unmotivated operations may be shaped by 
such factors as the number of hours ashore mission-site facilities are open during the day, 
the number of days spent at each mission site or host nation, the availability of 
pharmaceuticals, fair and orderly queuing processes governing access to treatment for 
patients at the mission-sites, and realistic transportation options for patients required to 
visit the Hospital Ship (T-AH) for surgery.  These factors, in turn, are dependent upon 
optimizing such HA processes as transportation, personnel assignment, patient selection, 
material allocation, and mission-site organization.  
Finally, HA operations will be subject to media scrutiny.  The media will likely 
have more access to HA operations than to traditional combat operations, and the 
perception that HA operations are discretionary invites media analysis of the operation’s 
value. A factor in whether the media will praise or criticize HA operations will be the 
media’s perception of the operations as reflecting or lacking the expeditionary acumen 
and capability expected from the U.S. military.  The latter was the case when, following 
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COMFORT’s 2007 deployment, an article entitled “Feel-Good Diplomacy” appeared in 
the Baltimore Sun, cataloging the ways in which COMFORT did not deliver its full 
potential of medical assistance during the deployment [Little, 2007].  Figure 1 shows 
COMFORT at anchor while conducting HA operations in Haiti during the 2007 
deployment. 
 
Figure 1.   Photograph of USNS COMFORT anchored offshore while conducting HA 
operations in Haiti during the 2007 deployment [Leavitt, 2007].           
An additional and overarching motivation for an increased focus on HA 
performance is succinctly expressed by Rear Admiral Timberlake, United States Joint 
Forces Command (USJFCOM) Surgeon: 
The U.S. Military has always succeeded because we have great people – 
both line and medical personnel.  We succeed in tasks we are given – like 
HADR – even without extensive planning.  However, it often is 
accomplished at great personal cost in terms of time, effort, and stress.  
Each time, we seem to start all over again from scratch…We are not 
prepared or set up to do humanitarian assistance and disaster relief as 
efficiently as we could [Mosier and Orthner, 2007].  
Prior to 2005, T-AH HA and DR deployments were relatively infrequent.  Recent T-AH 
deployments have been rushed through a hasty planning process, necessarily so in the 
case of DR operations (e.g., following the 2005 Tsunami) but without good justification 
for deliberate HA operations.  These operations have not benefited from the sort of 
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rigorous analysis that characterizes other military operations.  With only limited 
experience in HA operations, realistic upper bounds for what can be accomplished during 
HA are unknown (making it difficult to characterize an operation as a success or failure).  
Further, bad practices could be solidifying during haphazard operations.  There is 
recognition that past HA and DR operations have been muscled through by the devoted 
personnel involved, without much premium placed on operations analysis and efficiency, 
or much reliance on planning and doctrine [Mosier and Orthner, 2007].  Yet, as was the 
case with the 2007 COMFORT deployment, the operation was designed, in part, as a 
training mission.  Training to inefficient practices potentially inhibits future performance 
when HA capability is applied to a critical DR situation.  
Underscoring the strategic implications of future HA operations, the U.S. may 
soon be joined by another nation conducting medical HA from a hospital ship. The 
Chinese Navy has recently commissioned a hospital ship of its own (Figure 2).  Whether 
the intention is for this vessel to fulfill a traditional hospital ship role in major military 
operations or to be a vehicle for HA and the projection of Chinese influence is unknown.  
The potential for competing U.S. and Chinese hospital ship-based HA in the developing 
world, or possibly combined operations in a DR setting, is fascinating.  This entrance of a 
potential peer competitor, with what could be a combined force multiplying asset, to the 
practice of hospital ship operations further highlights the need for operationally efficient 
U.S. T-AH HA.        
 
Figure 2.   Chinese Hospital Ship Commissioned in 2007 [China Defense Today, 2007] 
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B. NAVAL HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE OPTIMIZATION 
The necessity to live up to the claim that HA is a core capability for the Navy 
brings urgency and meaning to analytical efforts aimed at improving naval HA. This 
thesis develops a mathematical optimization model to assist key decision makers 
involved in naval HA in addressing one of many HA problems which would likely 
benefit from rigorous quantative analysis.  Mathematical optimization models "represent 
problem choices as decision variables and seek values that maximize or minimize 
objective functions of the decision variables subject to constraints on variable values 
expressing limits on possible decision choices" [Rardin, 2000].  As such, problems which 
can be represented in terms of decisions and constraints are appropriate for mathematical 
optimization modeling.         
There are unique aspects to T-AH HA that preclude the application of standard 
military operations models and doctrine.  The T-AH represents both the launching point 
for medical personnel going ashore (analogous to an amphibious assault ship), yet with 
the added complication of also serving as one of several hubs of mission-objective 
activity.  Specialized medical personnel and materials, along with logistics and 
communication capability, must be resourced in the correct proportion to meet the unique 
needs of the HA mission.  NGOs are likely to contribute resources, especially personnel, 
but also impose unique constraints. Taken together, these factors make T-AH HA and DR 
operations an especially fertile area for the meaningful application of mathematical 
optimization.  
In the case of COMFORT’s 2007 HA deployment, complicated problems and 
time constraints frequently left decision makers without a means to make optimal 
decisions.  Most clearly observed and understood by the author was the "ship-to-shore 
transportation problem" (SSTP), defined here as the daily need to determine 
transportation asset (helicopters, watercraft, land vehicles) routing and loading to effect 
movement of personnel and patients between ship and ashore mission site.2  Among the 
                                                 
2 The author spent three weeks aboard USNS COMFORT, taking part in HA operations in Belize, 
Guatemala and Panama.  
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T-AH HA problems which may benefit from optimization, in this thesis we address the 
SSTP because modeling the problem objectives and constraints does not require a 
specialized understanding of medical matters.   
In addition to the SSTP, other tactical level problems faced daily during 
COMFORT’s deployment included allocation of specialized personnel to remain on 
COMFORT or to staff ashore mission sites, management of patient queues and of 
services to be provided at mission sites, daily allocation of limited pharmaceuticals and 
other consumable material, and management of the scheduling, intake, treatment and 
release of surgical patients treated aboard COMFORT.  Each of these areas presented 
challenges unique to T-AH HA operations.  For instance, because surgical patients had to 
be discharged before COMFORT’s scheduled departure from the host nation’s waters, 
surgeries with longer recovery times had to be scheduled as early as possible during 
COMFORT’s visit, and some otherwise feasible procedures were made infeasible by 
post-surgical recovery time constraints.  This represents a unique variation of the Robust 
Surgery Loading Problem faced by hospitals everywhere and studied as an optimization 
problem, where utilization of operating theaters may be maximized by treating surgical 
assignments as a stochastic knapsack problem [Hans et.al., 2006].   
In addition to these tactical-level problems, a host of complex weekly and 
mission-wide decisions had to be made, some before the COMFORT deployment 
commenced.  Because COMFORT’s deployment consisted of a series of six to seven-day 
visits in twelve different countries, many operational decision parameters changed on a 
weekly basis, and resources assigned to last through the deployment had to be 
apportioned among the visited countries (arbitrarily in some cases).  Decisions made 
prior to the deployment included the selection of host nations to receive HA, the selection 
of mission sites within those host nations, designation of a range of medical and other 
services to be carried out during the HA, the assignment of personnel to COMFORT with 
the right skills to effect the selected services, and the scheduling of the deployment.  The 
application of mathematical optimization (and Operations Research in general) to any of 
these areas would likely contribute to improved HA performance for the Navy.           
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C.   HOSPITAL SHIPS AND THE TRANSPORTATION PROBLEM  
We address the SSTP (defined in section B above) faced by a T-AH conducting 
HA operations in situations where the ship is not able to berth at a pier in the host nation 
(a common occurrence resulting from the ship’s relatively large draft and port or pierside 
support limitations in developing countries).   While ship-to-shore movement would 
normally be one of the expeditionary capabilities making naval forces invaluable to HA, 
the T-AH faces some inherent obstacles relating to the ship’s design, limited indigenous 
capabilities, and doctrinal shortcomings (discussed below).  Aggravating the inherent 
obstacles during past deployments has been the use of a manual transportation scheduling 
process unsuitable for quickly dealing with a complex and time-sensitive problem.  
Further, T-AH HA missions have not generally been staffed by the Navy’s expeditionary 
experts (those familiar with the Marine Corps ship-to-shore movement doctrine), so 
unfamiliarity with complex logistical problems may have impeded decision makers.   
In this context, a typical SSTP includes scheduling two helicopters, several 
watercraft (with different speeds, capacities, and abilities to function in certain sea 
states), and an assortment of ground vehicles to move over two-hundred T-AH personnel 
and patients between the ship and several mission sites, often traveling through 
intermediate nodes.  In the majority of cases, this is not a trivial problem to optimize.  
Especially problematic for the manual scheduler is understanding the tradeoff between 
different modes of transportation and resisting the temptation to inefficiently simplify the 
problem by attempting to move all personnel en masse first to an intermediate node, and 
then out to mission sites or the ship.  
During COMFORT’s 2007 deployment, sub-optimal transportation schedules 
were observable to, and felt by, the hundreds of medical and support personnel who spent 
frustrating hours assembled together but unable to maximize mission accomplishment 
because transportation constraints and scheduling lapses left them marooned at a boat 




at a time.  Such situations are especially poignant when one considers the opportunity 
cost of allowing specialized medical personnel, some of them NGOs, to sit idle while 
waiting for transportation.          
1. Hospital Ship Design and Capabilities 
The two U.S. Navy hospital ships, MERCY and COMFORT, were initially 
constructed and operated as oil tankers under different names, going through a 
conversion process to become hospital ships in the mid 1980’s.  Central to the T-AH 
SSTP is the fact that the T-AH was not intended to operate as a stand-alone platform, or 
as the Command ship in an operation involving other assets.  Published Navy doctrine on 
T-AH operations [Department of the Navy, 2004] specifies: 
The preferred method of moving patients is by helicopter.  In port, patients 
can be removed via the gangways (if pierside).  If anchored, the ship can 
move patients to the port and starboard side ports for transfer to surface 
craft.  The hospital ship owns neither air nor surface craft.  Ultimate 
responsibility for providing patient transportation to and from the hospital 
ships belongs to the theater commander.  The OPLAN [Operational Plan] 
should detail the transportation plan. (Author’s emphasis added) 
While this doctrine is perfectly appropriate for a T-AH operating in conjunction with a 
large, deployed combat force, it does not serve the T-AH operating in a HA capacity 
where neither the combat force nor its associated logistics capacity are present. 
 Recognizing the T-AH’s shortcomings, effects have been made to provide the 
ships with some indigenous transportation capability.  Prior to MERCY’s 2006 
deployment, a temporary helicopter shelter was installed.  The addition of embarked 
helicopters was intended to allow the T-AH to “operate flexibly without support” 
[Horvath, 2006].  While providing shelter for embarked helicopters, this structure 
reduced the number of landing spots on the T-AH from two to one.  Also added at this 
time were two small watercraft, less than ideal for ship-to-shore movement due to their 
slow speed, limited capacity, difficultly embarking and debarking passengers, limited 
operability in rough seas, and inability to protect passengers (some who will be sick or 
injured patients) from the elements.  Identical modifications were made to COMFORT.      
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As of early 2008, plans are in place to further modify the T-AH’s indigenous 
transportation capability.  A near-term modification will be the replacement of the current 
helicopter shelter with a permanently mounted hanger.  Directly significant to one of the 
constraints currently faced in the SSTP, the layout and certification of the flight deck will 
be addressed to allow for two landing spots.  Also under study, but without a definitive 
implementation date set, is the addition of two ‘patient tender’ watercraft to the T-AH.  
Each patient tender will have a capacity for 150 personnel, be enclosed to protect the 
passengers from the elements, move at a speed of 14 kts, and be embarked and 
disembarked from the T-AH via a boat davit system [Zarkowsky, 2007].  The planned 
patient tenders will be vastly superior to current watercraft which expose personnel to the 
elements, embark and disembark personnel through a precarious process alongside the T-
AH, and move slowly.  While funded, patient tender procurement and installation is 
currently delayed by a shortage of available units from manufactures.  Analysis of the 
impact of patient tenders will be discussed in Chapter III.     
2.  Previous Hospital Ship Humanitarian Assistance Operations    
In January 2005, MERCY deployed as a part of Operation Unified Assistance to 
take part in tsunami-relief operations in Southeast Asia, treating Indonesian patients 
between 5 February and 14 March.  Arriving well over a month after the tsunami had 
struck, the majority of patients seen by MERCY personnel received treatment for 
conditions unrelated to the tsunami, rendering the mission largely HA (vice DR) in 
nature.  Remaining deployed, MERCY went on to conduct deliberate HA operations in 
areas unrelated to the tsunami, and also to respond to emergent DR situations over the 
next several months.  A Center for Naval Analysis report on the 2005 deployment 
concluded “The major non-medical constraints on the medical mission were physical 
access to the hospital ship, helicopter life capacity, mission scheduling issues, and force 
protection precautionary measures” [Morrow and McGrady, 2006].  Helicopter lift was 
the sole transportation means on or off MERCY in some operational areas, while boat 
and helicopter operations were possible in other areas, with boats being obtained from the 
host nation.  The report notes a consequence of the limited transportation capacity and the 
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requirement to return all personnel to MERCY each night was that ashore operations shut 
down as early as 15:00h so personnel could muster and await their return trip. This not 
only reduced time ashore to conduct the primary mission of medical treatment, but also 
prevented MERCY personnel from attending evening planning meetings with shore-
based NGOs.  Finally, the report also notes that on days when the helicopters were not 
operated (possibly due to maintenance or inclement weather) or were tasked to effect 
transfer of rotating medical personnel, there were no patient admissions aboard MERCY.        
In April 2006, MERCY commenced another HA deployment, this time to the 
Philippines, Bangladesh, Indonesia, and East Timor.  Utility boats and the 
aforementioned helicopter shelter to support embarked helicopters were added to 
MERCY prior to the deployment.  The utilization of utility boats to achieve a portion of 
the movement between ship and shore represented a significant change in the SSTP 
MERCY would face in 2006 compared with 2005.  Utility boats offered medical 
providers ashore a flexible and responsive means to move personnel, patients and 
material between ship and shore to meet emergent requirements [Schiemel, 2007].  
Despite this, transportation between ship and shore still represented a significant 
constraint on the mission, “significantly [reducing] the number of hours available to 
conduct medical operations ashore on any given day” [Strauss, 2007, p.25].  In the case 
of one operating area, shallow waters forced MERCY to remain more than 30 nm 
offshore, relying completely on helicopters for transportation.  In other cases, MERCY 
came much closer to shore and utilized both boats and helicopters, but it was calculated 
that, as utilized, combined transportation assets were rarely allowed more than 150 
personnel to travel to ashore mission sites during the day [Strauss, 2007, p.35].      
It is clear the transportation challenges present during COMFORT’s 2007 
deployment had been previously identified during MERCY’s HA deployments. While 
analysis has been done on the benefit of increasing transportation capability, no analysis 
has been found regarding optimization of the schedule for existing transportation assets.  
A Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) Information Systems thesis dating to the initial years 
of MERCY class operations recommends addition of a decision support system be added 
to the ship’s information systems to optimize the loading of evacuation assets (helicopters 
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and boats), and noted the ‘stubby pencil’ is the current means of assigning outgoing 
patients to transportation assets [Sosh, 1988, p.85].  During T-AH HA deployments 
through 2007, the ‘stubby pencil’ remained the scheduler’s only tool.     
3.  Manual Solutions to the Transportation Problem    
A manual process for devising transportation schedules must be used absent the 
availability of decision support tools.  The focus of manual scheduling, when faced with a 
complex and time-consuming problem, inevitably becomes finding a feasible solution 
within the allocated timeframe without regard to optimality.  Manual scheduling has 
specific drawbacks in four areas: it is a time consuming process, it leads to inefficient 
simplifications of the schedule or overly conservative decisions, varying vehicle 
capacities and group sizes make optimal vehicle-group parings unobvious, and it does not 
lend itself to quantitative analysis of other operational decisions due to a lack of 
analytical formality.  All of these drawbacks were observed first-hand by the researcher 
and other NPS personnel who participated in the COMFORT 2007 deployment.    
Discussion of the four areas of drawback follows. 
  1) Time Consuming Process.  Manual generation of the following day’s 
transportation schedule may take hours of time and typically occurs late in the evening.   
Schedules cannot always be devised in advance because they are dependent on 
operational parameters, such as the specific number of personnel and patients moving 
between ship-and-shore, which are themselves reevaluated by planning personnel daily.  
Specific decisions defining these operational parameters for the following day are not 
made until late in the prior day when the outcome of that day’s operations has been 
accessed.  Time consumed by the scheduling process also comes at the expense of other 
planning and attention to command and control functions, as the individual responsible 
for transportation planning will have many other staff responsibilities.  
 2) Inefficient schedule simplifications and conservative decisions.  In 
order to manually deal with a complex scheduling problem, planners may utilize 
inefficient simplifications of the process.  For example, the planner may break the 
schedule for personnel returning to the ship into two distinct phases, first executing the 
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ground transport all personnel from several mission sites to a consolidated Boat Landing 
Zone (BLZ, generally a transfer point for personnel between watercraft and ground 
vehicles), and only then beginning to execute the transfer of personnel from the BLZ to 
the ship by watercraft.  While not having to consider concurrent scheduling of watercraft 
and vehicles simplifies the problem for the planner, it does not lead to optimal movement 
of personnel.  The practical result is that personnel stop work and depart their mission 
sites earlier than necessary, only to loiter unproductively (and unhappily) at a BLZ.  
Another simplification employed by the planner may be the implementation of a 
conservative schedule, for example, by having personnel muster or shut down operations 
earlier than necessary, loiter at a transshipment point longer than necessary, or have 
vehicles ready earlier than necessary in order to deal with uncertainty created not by 
legitimate variance in travel times or operations, but simply by imprecision in the process 
of manual calculations and a planner’s instinct towards conservatism.     
 3) Unobvious vehicle-group parings.  Another shortcoming of manual 
scheduling derives from the difficulty in recognizing when vehicle-group parings are not 
optimal, or whether alternative vehicle-group parings exist.  Manual combinatorial 
analysis is difficult, and the possibility exists a planner may not realize the most efficient 
vehicles to passenger group paring.  For example, consider a BLZ as the common 
transshipment point for three different-sized groups of personnel going to three different 
mission sites, and a fleet of vans with varying capacity available for transportation.  It 
may be tempting for the planner to simplifying the scheduling by assigning a third of the 
vehicles to service each personnel group.  This assignment could leave empty seats on the 
arbitrarily assigned vehicles going to one destination, while forcing some passengers 
from a larger group to wait for vehicles assigned to their group to return and make a 
second trip.  
4) Lack of analytical formality. The manual scheduling process does not 
lend itself to analysis of operational decisions, such as the anchoring position of the T-
AH, the trade-off between using helicopter or watercraft and ground transportation, or the 
procurement of additional host-nation transportation assets.  The Commander is less  
 
 13
likely to rely on an imprecise manual process to inform his or her operational decisions 
than he or she would be if formal, quantative analysis were available from an automated 
decision support tool.  
D. THESIS GOALS AND OUTLINE 
This thesis seeks to develop and implement a mathematical optimization model to 
provide a decision support tool to decision makers aboard the T-AH responsible for the 
SSTP.  It is also intended to fulfill two other purposes: to provide a quantitative tool for 
the evaluation of notional transportation arrangements and potential T-AH modifications 
beyond the scope of the daily SSTP, and to identify other aspects of T-AH HA that are 
good candidates for the future application of Operations Research techniques.  
Manual SSTP solutions observed during COMFORT’s 2007 deployment were 
suboptimal.  To deal with the complex, time-sensitive and dynamic requirement to devise 
transportation schedules, a decision support tool, based on the model defined in this 
thesis, should be placed into the hands of decision makers during future T-AH 
deployments.  This tool will provide the decision makers with optimized schedules 
addressing the daily SSTP.  The decision maker will be able to specify the relative 
importance of competing objective function criteria in the optimization.    
Matters beyond solving the daily SSTP may be addressed.  For example, should 
resources be expended to increase the number of landing spots on MERCY and 
COMFORT from one to two?  How beneficial would it be to commit an amphibious ship 
to supporting T-AH HA operations?  How much priority should be given to the 
installation of patient tenders aboard MERCY and COMFORT?  To help answer 
questions of this nature, our mathematical models serve as a quantitative tool for the 
evaluation of transportation-capacity affecting decisions.  
Finally, as noted in Section A, T-AH HA operations are fertile ground for the 
meaningful application of Operations Research techniques, particularly mathematical 
optimization.  While this thesis is focused on the SSTP, the techniques for evaluating 
problem solutions in terms of mission performance will be generally applicable to other 
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areas of HA analysis.  As such, it is intended that this thesis will provide a baseline for 
further Operations Research study of HA and DR.   
The remainder of this document is organized as follows: Chapter II explains how 
we formulate the SSTP as a mathematical model, first by discussing the problem in 
general, then in detail with a focus on the objective function, and finally by providing the 
mathematical formulation.  Chapter III provides quantative analysis of the efficiencies 
and insights gained by using the model described in Chapter II.  To accomplish this 
analysis, criteria for evaluating SSTP solutions are defined, and SSTP scenarios are 
introduced.  Chapter III also uses the model to perform analysis of potential 
modifications to the T-AH class of ship.  Chapter IV concludes this document by 
summarizing computational results and highlighting their significance in light of the 
overall rational presented in Chapter I for applying mathematical optimization to HA.  
Discussion of the model’s implementation, dissemination of computational results, and 






II. MODELING APPROACH 
This chapter introduces the T-AH HA transportation (T-AH HAT) model that 
utilizes mathematical optimization to devise a schedule for ship-to-shore movement for 
the T-AH conducting HA from offshore.  Because we can reasonably represent many 
important facets of the SSTP in terms of quantifiable objectives and constraints, 
mathematical modeling is an appropriate means to address the SSTP. 
A. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE TRANSPORTATION PROBLEM  
This section discusses several concepts and problem specifications underlying the 
mathematical model (to be stated formally later in this chapter).   
One of these concepts is referred to as time period.  In order to represent the 
dynamics of the SSTP over time, continuous time is represented as a discrete set of time 
periods.  For example, if the operations to be modeled begin at 06:00h with a user-
defined period length of 10 minutes, the first time period corresponds to the continuous 
time interval between 06:00h and 06:10h, the second to the time interval between 06:10h 
and 06:20h, and so on. 
Another key concept is group, which we define as one or more people with a like 
starting position, destination, and time at the origin, among other parameters.  We shall 
see groups will also be associated with varying weighting schemes (penalties or 
incentives associated, e.g., with time delays) in the objective function.         
We now enumerate the specific entities (and their characteristics) in the SSTP that 
are captured in the T-AH HAT model: 
• There exists a discrete set of locations where personnel and vehicles may 
arrive, depart, or loiter.  Each location is represented as a node in the 
topographical representation of the SSTP. 
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• Each node is defined by a name, number of helicopter landing spots, 
number of watercraft embarkation or debarkation spots, and whether or 
not it is an acceptable location for helicopter shutdown. 
• Each vehicle is defined by identifier, starting node, type, and capacity. 
• General vehicle types include helicopters, ground vehicles, and watercraft.  
• Nodes may be connected by node-to-node paths called arcs, forming a 
network. 
• Some arcs are not feasible for some vehicle types. 
• Each arc has a transit time associated with it for each vehicle type that can 
feasibly use the arc.    
• The speed of each vehicle type is accounted for to compute its travel time 
between nodes, if feasible. 
• Each vehicle is further characterized by relative fixed and incremental 
operating costs.   
• Incremental vehicle costs are based on the number of time periods of 
movement for ground vehicles and watercraft. For helicopters, incremental 
operating costs are incurred for every time period they are at any node not 
designated as an appropriate helicopter shutdown location, whether 
traveling or loitering on the ground.    
• When all vehicle types are considered, the network must be strongly 
connected (a feasible path exists from each node to all others in the 
network).   
• The helicopter shelter on a T-AH is a separate node from the T-AH flight 
deck, and the travel time between these two nodes corresponds to the time 
required to move the helicopter and change its condition from operational 
to inactive, or vice-versa.   
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• The number of helicopters present at a node is constrained by the number 
of helicopter landing spots at that node. 
• Helicopters must spend the time period following arrival at a node on the 
ground at that node (accounting for time required for loading, unloading, 
and refueling).   
• The number of watercraft arriving or departing from a node in the same 
time period is restricted by the number of watercraft embarkation or 
debarkation spots; multiple watercraft may loiter at a node with a single 
spot by mooring outboard of one another.   
• Each group is defined by identifier, size (number of people in the group), 
starting node, destination node, time of initial availability to travel from 
starting node, desired arrival time at destination node, and mandatory (i.e., 
latest feasible) arrival time at destination node.   
• Each group is further characterized by the relative importance of several 
potentially competing objectives: arrival at the destination node by the 
desired arrival time, minimization of time spent in transit, and delay at 
starting node before commencing transit.   
• Individual members of a group do not necessarily travel together.   
• All personnel in all groups must reach their destination node by the latest 
feasible arrival time.  Otherwise, the problem is deemed infeasible.   
B. SSTP AND THE GENERAL VEHICLE ROUTING PROBLEM  
Our SSTP is a variant of the often-discussed Vehicle Routing Problem (VRP) 
[Toth and Vigo, 2001]. It particularly resembles a VRP with time windows, pick-ups and 
deliveries.  Specific issues our VRP must address include the concept of personnel 
groups, a multimodal transportation network with transfers, node capacities (such as 
those for helicopters at the T-AH and other landing zones), and the fixed-charge for 
vehicle utilization, which implicitly designs the system capacity.   
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The VRP has received considerable attention in the Operations Research 
discipline.  Recent academic papers have focused on improved algorithms for efficient 
problem solution, particularly genetic and hybrid-genetic algorithms [Park, 2000].   
Because we have generally been able to reach global-optimal solutions within an 
acceptable amount of time, heuristics have not been necessary. Nonetheless, it is noted 
that heuristic algorithms could become necessary if the SSTP grew to consider 
significantly more transportation assets or nodes, perhaps across a theater of HA and DR 
operations.            
C. OBJECTIVE FUNCTION DESCRIPTION 
This sections details the composition, mechanics and rationale behind the T-AH 
HAT model’s objective function. This function seeks to minimize ‘transportation 
schedule cost’, which in fact comprises multiple individual objectives.  Therefore, our 
model is a multi-objective optimization problem in which we adopt a weighted-sum (of 
objectives) approach (see, e.g., Ehrgott [2005, p.65]).   
We consider two general categories of transportation schedule cost.  One is the 
cost of degraded mission performance if personnel and patients are not transported to 
their destinations in a timely fashion.  The other is the cost (monetary or otherwise) of 
utilizing transportation assets.  Both of these cost categories are nuanced by a variety of 
subcategories, and by tradeoffs created by the relative weights assigned to each criteria.  
1. Degraded Mission Performance from Late Arrival 
Mission performance is a function of, among other things, time spent by providers 
treating patients ashore and aboard the T-AH.  Treatment of patients relies on 
transportation of providers and surgical patients between shore and T-AH.  When 
transportation becomes the active constraint on provider time spent treating patients, a 
mission performance cost is incurred.  The model establishes a desired arrival time for 
providers and patients who require transportation.  The desired arrival time is defined as 
the time at which the mission planner believes the personnel should arrive at their 
destination in order to achieve orderly and reliable mission performance given non-
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transportation constraints.  It is assumed that if a transportation solution can be found that 
delivers all providers and patients to their destination by the desired arrival time, no cost 
in degraded mission performance is incurred.  Desired arrival time is implemented in the 
model by a late arrival penalty charged per unit of time each person (mission personnel 
or patient) is not at their destination once the desired arrival time designated for their 
group has been reached.  The decision maker selects a base late arrival penalty for each 
group, reflecting the relative importance placed on timely arrivals for personnel in that 
particular group.  During preprocessing, the model associates the base late arrival penalty 
with the first time period in which each respective individual would be late, and then 
calculates exponentially increasing penalties for later time periods as a function of the 
base late arrival penalty, the number of time periods beyond the desired arrival time, and 
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where ∆AP(t) is the marginal per-person penalty incurred if arrival in period t has not 
occurred, d is the desired arrival period, l is the latest arrival period, and bLAP is the 
baseline late arrival penalty.  Note that, for clarity, we have dropped the group sub-index 












Figure 3.   Marginal late arrival penalty.  The graph shows the marginal penalty incurred 
per person in each time period the person is late. 
2. Expedite Arrival Penalty and Delay Initial Departure 
There are two competing refinements to the desired arrival time that a decision 
maker may employ.  We will refer to these two refinements as "expedite arrival" and 
"delay initial departure".  Refinement expedite arrival is characterized by adding the 
stipulation that transportation schedule solutions that deliver personnel in a specific 
group to their destinations sooner are preferable to those that take longer, irrespective of 
whether or not desired arrival time is met.  Two assumptions underlie this refinement:  
The first assumption is that there is some mission performance benefit derived from 
personnel arriving at their destination earlier than the desired arrival time; this may occur 
because it is feasible to begin operations earlier than planned, or because personnel may 
use the additional time at destination to be better prepared for when operations do begin 
as scheduled.  A second assumption is that performance and morale of providers, and the 
condition of patients, will be inversely proportional to time spent in transit.  Expedite 
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arrival is implemented in the model through an expedite arrival penalty charged per unit 
of time each person is not at their destination, regardless of whether desired arrival time 
has been reached (see Figure 4).  This penalty must, at a minimum, ensure the quicker 
transportation route will be chosen over the longer route when mission performance and 
transportation costs are otherwise equal or nearly equal.  The decision maker can scale 
the penalty to reflect the degree to which he or she favors transportation solutions with 
earlier arrivals.    If the penalty is made very large, it will eventually overwhelm desired 
arrival time and transportation cost considerations, leading to selection of the schedule 
with the earliest feasible arrival times.  The intention, however, is for the penalty to be 
used in a more nuanced fashion.  There is utility in applying the expedite arrival penalty 
in the objective function at a low level even if the decision maker does not specifically 
desire early arrivals; the penalty ensures that quicker routes will be chosen over slower 
routes, ceteris paribus.  Marginal expedite arrival penalties are calculated as: 
 ( ) (1.2)EAPEAP t b t∆ = ∀  
where ∆EAP(t) is the marginal per-person penalty incurred if arrival in period t has not 
occurred, and bEAP is the baseline expedite arrival penalty.  Again, this penalty will be 
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Figure 4.   Marginal expedite arrival penalty.  The graph shows the marginal penalty 
incurred per person in each time period the person has not arrived at their 
destination.    
Refinement delay initial departure is characterized by favoring transportation 
schedule solutions which have a later initial departure time for personnel in a specific 
group from their starting position, compared to those with an earlier departure, assuming 
both allow for arrival by the desired arrival time. The assumptions that any mission 
performance benefit derived from an early arrival is outweighed by the benefit of 
allowing personnel to rest (if originating on the T-AH) or continue working (if 
originating at a mission site) underlies this refinement.  The delay initial departure 
refinement is implemented through a delay departure incentive (inventive vice penalty 
because cost is being subtracted).  The delay departure incentive is established by a user 
defined base incentive, and is then awarded, in linearly decreasing quantities, for each 
period all members of the designated group remain together (see Figure 5).  Marginal 
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where ∆DDI(t) is the marginal per-person incentive earned if the person’s group remains 
together at their origin in period t, d is the desired arrival period, a is the group’s first 
period of availability in the problem, and bDDI is the baseline delay departure incentive.  
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Figure 5.   Marginal delay initial departure.  The graph shows the marginal incentive 
awarded per person in each time period the person’s group remains together at 
their origin.   
A notional example of the combined potential effect of the two penalties and the 
incentive described above is depicted in Figure 6, with the cumulative effect of each 
penalty (or incentive) represented as a separate line.  In this example, bLAP = 16, bEAP = 
10, and bDDI = 50.  While a strict hierarchy of penalties does not exist in our model 
(scaling many competing penalties is left up the user), the eventual dominance of one 
objective is desired.  Because moving personnel in a timely fashion to their required 
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destination is our founding objective, the late arrival penalty is designed to outweigh all 
others by the latest arrival time.  This is the rationale for exponentially increasing the late 
arrival penalty. That is, the operating costs for vehicles or the incentive to delay 
departure should never create a situation where the optimal solution does not involve 
getting personnel to their destination eventually, assuming doing so is feasible (although 
it is possible the user could input a disproportionately large penalty or incentive working 
against the latest arrival time).     
Time







Figure 6.   A notional example of the combined potential effect of the two penalties and 
the incentive described in this section (each shown cumulatively).   
3. Transportation Asset Costs 
Operating costs for transportation assets are also modeled in the objective 
function.  These costs fall into two general categories: fixed and variable.  The fixed cost 
associated with a transportation asset is incurred if the asset is ever used during the 
modeled timeframe.  The variable cost is incurred per time period the asset is in motion 
(with an expended definition discussed below with regard to helicopters).         
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Regarding embarked helicopters, the fixed cost in our model represents the costs 
in personnel and required maintenance stemming from preparing the helicopter for flight 
and then returning it to a maintained condition.  By setting a relatively high fixed cost for 
helicopter utilization, the decision maker can ensure a helicopter is brought out of its 
shelter and operated only when cost effective towards meeting operational goals.  The 
variable cost associated with helicopter utilization is incurred during every time period 
the helicopter is not at a user-designed node where it can shut down (presumably the T-
AH deck or shelter in most cases), thus any time spent flying or loitering at other nodes is 
considered to incur variable cost.  If host-nation or non-embarked helicopters are 
available, the decision maker has the option to designate these as zero cost assets to 
maximize their utilization, or to assign them costs equivalent or in some relative 
proportion to those of the embarked helicopters to achieve the desired distribution of 
work.   
While the actual monetary costs (in personnel, training, capital equipment, fuel, 
repair parts) associated with operating embarked helicopters are hidden from (and 
irrelevant to) the planner, a constraint on the number of flight-hours per month serves as a 
proxy for all the hidden costs and is of real concern to planners.  The decision maker may 
use both the fixed and variable costs assigned to embarked helicopters to limit helicopter 
utilization to a level commensurate with the monthly fight hour constraint.  A discussion 
of techniques to apply the monthly flight hour constraint to daily transportation problems 
is presented in Chapter III, Section D.         
Regarding watercraft and ground vehicles, both fixed and variable costs are 
potentially needed to model the way scheduling of these assets will be important to the 
planner.  Government owned assets, such as the watercraft indigenous to the T-AH or 
vehicles made available by the U.S. embassy in the host nation, are not likely to present 
costs relevant to the planner.  Some variable cost may be applied to these assets simply to 
limit their utilization, although it is unlikely the planer would scale these costs to compete 
with other mission performance criteria like late arrivals.  More significant is the 
contracting for local watercraft and vehicles.  Because a wide range of contracting 
schemes exists, the fixed and variable costs for locally procured assets in the model may 
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represent different things depending on the particular situation.  For example, a fixed-
price contract costing a set dollar-amount per day for watercraft service between the T-
AH and a BLZ, regardless of how many trips were made, would be represented by a fixed 
cost only.  Conversely, if contracted watercraft were charged to the ship purely on a per-
trip basis, this would be modeled through the variable cost mechanism.           
D.  MATHEMATICAL FORMULATION 
This section describes the Hospital Ship Humanitarian Assistance Transportation 
(T-AH HAT) model, a weighted-sum, multi-objective, mixed-integer optimization model.     
1.  Sets and Indices 
t , period of time, for t ∈ T.  All periods have the same duration, 
e.g., 15 minutes. 
n, n', nodes, for n, n'∈ N.  May refer to ship, mission site, or 
transshipment point.   
g , group, for g ∈G.  A group consists of personnel with a like 
starting point and destination. 
v , vehicle, for v ∈V.  May refer to either a helicopter, boat, or 
land transport. 
Nh , subset of N where a helicopter is not able to shut down. 
VH , subset of V containing only helicopter vehicles. 
VW , subset of V containing only watercraft vehicles. 
AVv,n,n' , Subset of triplets (v, n, n') where vehicle v can travel from 
node n to node n'.   
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2.  Parameters (Units) 
Atimev,n, n' , Number of time periods it takes vehicle v to travel from 
node n to node n' (periods). 
Goriging , node where group g originates (node index).  
Gdestinationg , destination node for group g (node index). 
Gsizeg , number of personnel in group g (persons). 
Gavailableg , time period when group g initially becomes available 
(periods). 
GdesiredArrivalg , time at which group g is desired to arrive at its 
destination node (periods). 
GlatestArrivalg , time by which group g must have arrived at its 
destination node (periods). 
GbArrPenaltyg , base penalty per person in group g who has not arrived 
after GdesiredArrivalg (penalty points).  Same as bLAP in 
equation (1.1).     
GmovePenaltyg , penalty per time period and per person in group g who 
has not arrived at destination regardless of desired 
arrival time (penalty points). Same as bEAP in equation 
(1.2). 
GbDelayDepIncent g , base incentive (reward) in the time period group g 
initially becomes available, per person, for leaving 
entire group at their origin (negative penalty points). 
Same as bDDI in equation (1.3).   
NlandingZonesn , number of landing zones at node n (landing zones).  
NdockSpacesn , number of dock space for simultaneous loading or 
unload of passengers at node n (dock spaces).  
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Vavailablev , time period when vehicle v initially becomes available 
(periods).  
Voriginv, node where vehicle v originates (node index).  
Vcapacityv , maximum transportation capacity of vehicle v (persons). 
VfixedCostv , cost to make vehicle v available for service (penalty 
points per vehicle).  
VperiodCostv , variable cost (per time period) to utilize vehicle v 
(penalty points).   
3.  Derived Sets and Data (Units for Derived Data Only) 
Tv , subset of T when vehicle v is available. 
{ }|v vT t T t Vavailable= ∈ ≥  
TAg , subset of T where group g is available prior to their latest 
feasible arrival time. 
{ }|g g gTA t T Gavailable t GlatestArrival= ∈ ≤ <  
TEg , subset of T where group g is available prior to their 
desired arrival time. 
{ }|g g gTE t T Gavailable t GdesiredArrival= ∈ ≤ <  
TLg , subset of T where group g is late if not at destination. 
{ }|g gTL t T t GdesiredArrival= ∈ >  
Gdeltag,n,t , number of personnel in group g initially available at node 






Gsize n Gorign t Gavailable
Gdelta
= =⎧= ⎨⎩  
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n Vorign t Vavailable
Vdelta
= =⎧= ⎨⎩  
GarrPenaltyg,t , Marginal penalty in period t per person in group g who 
has not arrived after the desired arrival time (penalty 
points).  Calculated as in equation (1.1) where bLAP = 
GbArrPenaltyg ,d = GdesiredArrivalg ,and l = 
GlatestArrivalg . 
GdelayDepIncent g,t , Marginal incentive in period t per person for leaving 
entire group g at their origin (negative penalty points).  
Calculated as in equation (1.3) where bDDI = 
GbLateDepIncentg ,d = GdesiredArrivalg , and a = 
Gavailableg . 
 
4.  Decision Variables (Units) 
GWg,n,t , number of personnel in group g waiting at node n at time t 
(personnel).  
GXg,v,n,n',t , number of personnel in group g transported by vehicle v from 
node n to node n' leaving at time period t (personnel). 
GUg,t , number of personnel in group g who have not arrived at their 
destination by time t (personnel).  
VWv,n,t , one if vehicle v is waiting at node n at time t, zero otherwise 
(binary).  
VXv,n,n',t , one if vehicle v travels from node n to node n' leaving at time 
t, zero otherwise (binary).  
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VSv , one if vehicle v is utilized during the mission day, zero 
otherwise (binary).  
Togetherg,t , one if group g remains together at their origin at time t, zero 
otherwise (binary). 
 
5.  Mathematical Formulation of T-AH HAT Model 
Objective Function 
 
min (GarrPenaltyg ,tGUg ,t
g∈G
t∈TLg






∑ ) + ( Atimev ,n,n 'VperiodCostvVXv ,n,n ',t
n,n '











  (2.1) 
Constraints 
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GX Vcapacity VX v n n t v AV t T   ≤   ∀ ∈ ∈∑    (2.2) 
           , , ', , ', , , ', | ,v n n vv n n t vVX VS v n n t v AV t T≤ ∀ ∈ ∈     (2.3) 
 
GWg ,n,t + GX g ,v ,n ',n,t−( Atimev ,n ',n )+1 + Gdeltag ,n,t    
v ,n '
∑
= GWg ,n,t+1 + GX g ,v ,n,n ',t+1
v ,n '
∑ ∀g,n,t | t ≠|T |       (2.4) 
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= + ∀ ≠ ∈
∑
∑    (2.5) 
 
GWg ,Gdestinationg ,t + GUg ,t = Gsizeg ∀g,t | t ∈TAg      (2.6) 
 
VWv ,n,t    ≤ NlandingZonesn      ∀
v∈V H
∑ n,t       (2.7)  
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VXv ,n,n ',t   +VXv ,n ',n,t−( Atimev ,n ',n)+1  ≤ NdockSpacesn      ∀
v∈V W
n '∈N
∑ n,t    (2.8) 
 
 
VWv ,n,t+1 ≥ VXv ,n ',n,t−( Atimev ,n ',n )+1
n '∈AVv ,n ',n
Atimev ,n ',n ≤t
∑    ∀v | v ∈V H ,n,t | t ≠|T |,t ∈Tv   (2.9) 
 
GsizegTogetherg ,t ≤ GWg ,Goriging ,t      ∀g,t ∈TEg      (2.10) 
, 0    , |g t gGU g t t GlatestArrival= ∀ ≥      (2.11) 
 
GWg ,n,Gavailableg = 0    ∀g,n        (2.12) 
 
GX g ,v ,n,n ',Gavailableg = 0    ∀g,n,n ',v|v ∈ AVv ,n,n '      (2.13) 
 
VWv ,n,Vavailablev = 0    ∀v,n        (2.14) 
 
VXv ,n,n ',Vavailablev = 0    ∀v,n,n ' | n ' ∈ AVv ,n,n '      (2.15) 
GX, GW, and GU variables are non-negative and integer   (2.16) 
VX, VW, VS, and Together variables are non-negative and binary  (2.17) 
 
6.  Description of the Formulation  
The objective function (2.1) minimizes ‘cost’ in the sense described in Section C. 
Constraint (2.2) enforces vehicle capacity, while constraint (2.3) enforces the 
application of a fixed cost for vehicle utilization if the subject vehicle makes any trips.   
Constraint (2.4) and (2.5) enforce balance of flow for personnel and vehicles 
through nodes.     
Constraint (2.6) accounts for personnel who have not arrived at their destination 
as unmet demand, for the purposes of applying penalties and ensuring eventual arrival.     
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Constraint (2.7) limits the number of helicopters at a node to the number of 
helicopter landing spots at that node, while constraint (2.8) limits the number of 
watercraft that can arrive at or depart from a node in a single time period to the number of 
embarkation/debarkation spots.     
Constraint (2.9) prevents a helicopter from leaving a node during the first period 
following its arrival, thus accounting for the time required to load, unload, and refuel the 
helicopter.      
Constraint (2.10) requires that for a group to be considered intact, for the purposes 
of eligibility for the delay departure incentive, the number of personnel in the group 
remaining at their originating node must equal the group size.        
Constraints (2.11) – (2.15) are ‘boundary’ conditions for the problem.  In 
particular, (2.11) enforces requirement for all personnel to reach their destination by the 
latest acceptable arrival time.  Constraints (2.12) – (2.15) prevent personnel and vehicles 
from traveling during the time period in which they are instantiated in the problem.  Note: 
this constraint is necessary because the aforementioned balance of flow constraints rely 
on the prior time period to constrain the current period, thus leaving the first period for 
each entity in the problem unconstrained (allowing the model to instantiate phantom 
people and vehicles if left unchecked). To make this constraint transparent to the user, the 
user defined start time for the problem and initial availability times are decremented by 
one time period in the model’s implementation.  As a result, a problem defined by the 
user to begin at 06:00h with five minute time periods and with groups and vehicles also 
becoming available at 06:00 will actually begin at 05:55 in the implementation, allowing 
scheduled movement to begin at 06:00.  
Constraints (2.16) and (2.17) limit the range of all decision variables to non-
negative and integer or binary values. 
E. IMPLEMENTATION 
The mixed-integer T-AH HAT optimization model described in Section D has 
been implemented in Xpress-MP [Dash Optimization, 2008], on a 2GHz personal 
 33
desktop computer with 2Mb of RAM.  Xpress-MP tackles the problem by first solving a 
relaxed, linear version using the dual simplex algorithm, then utilizes a branch and bound 
technique to search for optimal integer solutions [Dash Optimization, 2007].  All of our 
scenarios (described in Chapter III) are solved within at least 5% of optimality in no more 
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III. COMPUTATIONAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
This chapter provides quantative analysis of the efficiencies gained by using the 
T-AH HAT optimization model compared to manual scheduling.  To frame and carry out 
this analysis, parameter inputs to the model are discussed, criteria for evaluating SSTP 
solutions are defined, and SSTP scenarios are introduced.  Chapter III also uses T-AH 
HAT to perform analysis of potential modifications to the T-AH class of ship. 
A.  USER-DEFINED PARAMETERS  
1. Scenario Parameters 
User selection of the problem’s start time, end time, and minutes per period goes 
to the heart of balancing problem complexity with tractability.  Smaller increments of 
time provide greater model resolution and reduce unwanted delay caused by 
conservatively rounding up travel times.  Unfortunately, the cost of small time increments 
comes in the form of additional decision variables and constraints in the model; time is 
component of six different decision variable arrays, one of them five dimensional 
(GXg,v,n,n',t), so the effects of time increment size and length of planning horizon on 
problem complexity is significant. Faced with this complexity, it is possible a planner 
would choose to optimize a half day’s transportation schedule, vice the fully operational 
day in a single run.  These half-day schedules are suitable to the problem because daily 
personnel movement can be broken down into two distinct phases, the movement of 
personnel from the T-AH out to the mission sites in the morning (outgoing phase), and 
then return of T-AH personnel from mission sites in the evening (returning phase).  
Modeling over a shorter span of time allows for greater resolution in the individual time 
periods while maintaining an acceptable model run-time.  Of course, some transportation 
for patients, personnel and visitors may need to be scheduled midday, and this is 
accommodated in the model.          
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User scenario input is illustrated in Figure 7.  Significantly, while the user sets the 
span of the model’s time periods in terms of minutes per period, adjustments are made in 
the implementation to ensure the relative relationship between time period based model 
features are not distorted.        
 
Figure 7.   User-defined scenario parameters 
2. Nodes 
In addition to assigning names to each node, the user also defines several node 
characteristics: the number of landing zones at the node, whether or not an embarked 
helicopter can shutdown at the node, and the number of docking spaces where watercraft 
can simultaneously load and unload passengers.  Although the T-AH helicopter shelter 
will typically be assigned two landing zones, this does not literally mean a helicopter can 
land in the shelter; the only path to shelter should be from the T-AH flight deck, and so 
the shelter's landing zones simply represent the ability to store helicopters.  Figure 8 
depicts this user interface.  Note: assignment of spatial X and Y coordinates to each node, 
as shown below, allows for creation of a network map, although this feature has not been 
pursued in this thesis.        
 
Figure 8.   User-defined node parameters 
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3. Topography 
The user must define the connectivity between the nodes within the modeled 
network.  A value of zero in the node-to-node travel time for any transportation asset 
indicates the path between those nodes is infeasible for that vehicle type.  A positive 
value represents the time, in minutes, required for the specified vehicle type to transit 
between the specified nodes.  Two categories of watercraft have been established, fast 
boat and slow boat, to reflect the variation in speed likely to be seen between watercraft 
of different design. Figure 9 depicts this user interface.  It is noted that while the model 
makes no specific allows for sea state and its affect on watercraft travel time, the user 
may take sea state into account when defining (or redefining based on changing weather 
conditions) the relevant node-to-node travel times.           
 
Figure 9.   User-defined topography parameters 
4. Personnel  
The user represents personnel in the model by defining groups, and can assign 
unique parameters to each of them.  Group parameters, depicted in Figure 10, have been 




Figure 10.   User-defined personnel parameters 
5. Transportation Assets  
The user must enumerate all transportation assets in the problem.  As depicted in 
Figure 11, for each asset, the user must provide a unique name, node of origin, initial 
time available, asset type (helicopter, ground vehicle, or watercraft), capacity, fixed cost 
for utilization, and period cost for utilization.   
 
Figure 11.   User-defined transportation asset parameters 
At a minimum, the period cost for each vehicle should be set to one.  A vehicle 
with a period cost of zero is likely to ‘wander’ in the optimized schedule because, without 
some cost associated with movement, a schedule where the un-penalized vehicle makes 
nonsensical trips without passengers is just as good (just as optimal) as a similar schedule 
without the ‘wandering’.    
The “FixedCost” parameter shown as a column in the Figure 11 screenshot 
corresponds to VfixedCostv defined in the model formulation, and should be used 
sparingly.  A fixed cost other than zero applied to a single vehicle v generates additional 
active constraints numbering on the order of n2t (one for each instance of the decision 
variable VXv,n,n',t for that v). as well as creating an additional binary decision variable 
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VSv.  To illustrate the effect of this added complexity, a problem instance that solves to 
optimality in 82 seconds with no active fixed cost constraints takes 167 seconds to solve 
with two active fixed cost constraints, and 2,334 seconds with four active fixed cost 
constraints. As a rule, the planner should avoid using the fixed cost constraints for 
transportation assets unless they are specifically trying to limit the number of assets used 
during the day, or conducting analysis on the number of vehicles required to achieve 
acceptable schedules (perhaps in advance of making decision regarding the number of 
host nation vehicles to rent).  The fixed cost should not be considered interchangeable 
with the variable cost.  
B.  CRITERIA FOR SCHEDULE EVALUATION  
Many criteria can be defined for evaluating a proposed transportation schedule as 
it relates to the SSTP.  Such criteria may be used to compare one feasible solution to 
another. The criteria which follow have been selected to evaluate how well a schedule 
performs in the key areas of supporting mission site operations ashore, minimizing 
transportation and waiting time for personnel, and making efficient use of transportation 
assets.  We assume mission site operations criteria are of primary concern because overall 
mission performance can be equated to, and is critically constrained by, hours of ashore 
mission site operation, where the amount of HA conducted is a function of the number of 
hours ashore mission sites are manned (fully or partially).   We also introduce the term 
wait time in the context of personnel criteria, as explained below.  The list of criteria in 
each category follows.  
Mission Site Operations Criteria: 
• For how long will each mission site be fully manned during the day? 
• For how long will each mission site be partially manned during the day? 
Personnel Criteria: 
• What is the average transit time for personnel by group and overall? 
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• What is the average time between the first and last personnel departure in each 
group, or, in other words, for how long are personnel waiting to begin 
transportation after their group becomes mission-ineffective because it has been 
broken up by the start of transport?  This will hereafter be referred to as wait time.     
Transportation Utilization Criteria: 
• For how long was each asset in use? 
• What was the overall ratio of seat utilization to capacity for each transportation 
type and overall?  
C.  GENERIC OPERATIONAL TOPOGRAPHY SCENARIOS  
Three generic operational topography scenarios have been created to represent 
typical situations faced by the T-AH during a HA visit to a host nation where the T-AH 
has remained at sea.  These scenarios will be used to evaluate model performance 
(Section E below), as well as to conduct sensitivity analysis relating to changes in 
transportation asset availability or operational parameters (Section F below).  These three 
scenarios (hereafter referred to as Scenario 1, Scenario 2, and Scenario 3, respectively) 
are loosely based on visits to Belize, Colombia, and Guatemala observed by the author 
and other NPS personnel during COMFORT’s 2007 deployment.  All scenarios share 
some common parameters: two embarked helicopters, two slow organic watercraft on the 
T-AH, and problems initiating at 06:00h and continuing until 20:00h with 10-minute time 
periods.  Although the T-AH HAT model is capable of scheduling many groups of 
personnel throughout the day (e.g., patients, VIP visitors to the ship, or supplemental 
medical personnel sent ashore) only the core group of personnel traveling to the mission 
sites (MS) is included in these scenarios because the mid-day movement is generally less 
constrained and thus less interesting to our analysis.  MSs discussed in connection with 
each of these scenarios are indexed MS1, MS2, and so forth according to the number of 
MSs represented in the scenario.  To convey how these three scenarios represent a range 
of nuanced variations in the operational situation, a short description of each follows, 
with other varying parameters shown in Table 1:     
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Scenario 1.  The general situation is the T-AH is anchored in a position offshore 
such that there are 80-minute and 70-minute travel times by slow watercraft from T-AH 
to the two active BLZs, respectively.  Four mission sites are in operation.  One site, one 
of two that are relatively remote, has been accessed to have the greatest medical need. 
Priority is given to maximizing mission site operation at the high-need site through (a) a 
relatively large expedite arrival penalty for the outgoing trip from the T-AH, and (b) a 
relatively large delay departure incentive for the return trip.   
Scenario 2. The general situation is the T-AH is anchored in a position offshore 
such that there is are 90-minute and 60-minute travel times by slow watercraft from ship 
to the two active BLZs, respectively. Four mission sites are in operation.  In addition to 
the T-AH's embarked helicopters, the host nation has also provided two helicopters that 
must be scheduled.  One site, a hospital, does not open its doors until 09:00h, so there is 
no utility in an early arrival; however, the hospital will remain open in the afternoon so 
long as T-AH personnel are available to see patients.  This is reflected in the database by 
applying a delay departure incentive to the group supporting the hospital both when 
scheduling their outgoing trip (to maximize their rest on the T-AH and avoid an 
unnecessarily early arrival) and when scheduling their return (to maximize operating 
hours ashore).    
Scenario 3.  The general situation is the T-AH is anchored in a position offshore 
such that there is a 90-minute travel time by slow watercraft from ship to either of two 
active BLZs.  Three missions sites are in operation, one co-located with one of the BLZs 
(no ground transport required), and two others inland.  One of the mission sites is a 
hospital with fixed operating hours, so there is no utility in arriving at the site earlier than 
the desired arrival time, and likewise there is no utility in staying beyond the designated 
return time.  This is reflected in the database by applying a delay departure incentive to 
the group supporting this location when scheduling their outgoing trip (to maximize their 
rest on the T-AH and avoid an unnecessarily early arrival) while using an expedite arrival 
penalty to expedite their return trip.  At the other two mission sites, operational hours are 
not restricted by anything other than the transportation schedule, so in both cases the 
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associated groups of personnel are defined with expedite arrival penalties for their 
outgoing trips and delay departure incentives for their returns.                
Table 1.   Three generic operational topography scenarios  
 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
# Ashore Mission Sites  5 4 4 
# Transshipment Sites 2 1 1 
# Personnel Ashore 170 130 178 
# Host Nation Ground Vehicles  6 5 2 
# Host Nation Watercraft 2 2 3 
# Host Nation Helicopters 0 2 0 
     
D.  APPLICATION OF MONTHLY FLIGHT HOUR CONSTRAINT  
A significant constraint on the availability of embarked helicopters to SSTP 
solutions comes from a monthly limitation on the gross number of flight hours utilized 
(previously discussed in Chapter II, Section C).  We now address the problem of applying 
this monthly constraint over a set of daily SSTPs.  This discussion precedes further 
analysis because the ability to control the number of flight hours used in a T-AH HAT 
optimization will be important in allowing comparisons between optimized and manual 
schedules where similar levels of helicopter utilization between solutions allow for a 
more meaningful (apples to apples, in parlance) comparison.   
We have explored various techniques to allocate helicopter flight hours among 
daily transportation problems.  Among them, the most promising uses an iterative process 
where the objective function penalty associated with helicopter utilization per period of 
time (Vperiodcostv) is first set to an equal level across a set of daily problems.  Then 
iterative adjustments are made to the penalty until aggregate helicopter utilization among 
all problems reaches the desired level.  This iterative technique is also effective in 
controlling helicopter utilization in a single SSTP.   It is noted that helicopter flight hours 
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could have been controlled in individual problems through a constraint rather than 
manipulation of objective function penalties, but this would not have provided a means of 
determining what the appropriate constraint should be if dealing with an aggregate 
(monthly) allowance and multiple SSTPs where the marginal value of flight hours differs 
among SSTPs. 
The benefit of flight hour allocation across a set of SSTPs by this process is 
demonstrated in Section E of this chapter following analysis where manual and optimized 
schedules are compared with flight hours matched at the individual SSTP level (vice in 
the aggregate).      
E.  COMPARISON OF MANUAL AND AUTOMATED SCHEDULING  
1. Generation of Pseudo-Manual Schedules  
It is desirable in any analysis of an optimization tool to determine how much 
better the optimized solution is compared to what is available without the benefit of 
optimization. Ideally, we would compare actual, manually produced transportation 
schedules from a prior T-AH HA operation with an optimized schedule produced by our 
model implementation in order to quantify the improvement realized through 
optimization.  Unfortunately, we do not have detailed data reflecting actual, manually 
generated schedules to use for comparison purposes. We do, however, have a good 
understanding of the manual transportation scheduling process as detailed in Chapter I, 
Section B.3.  This allows us to develop an algorithm to generate pseudo-manual 
schedules by generously approximating those that would be created manually.  Steps of 
the pseudo-manual schedule algorithm are:  
1) Muster all MTF personnel at the time of the earliest morning departure, 
regardless of when actual departure will occur.   
2) Execute movement of all personnel traveling by watercraft to BLZs prior to 
beginning ground transportation from corresponding BLZs to mission sites.   
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3) Apportion ground transportation among the groups of personnel on a pro-rata 
basis, or if vehicles are not obviously subdividable among groups, then by assigning the 
remainder vehicles to the largest groups.  
4) Once assigned to a group, use a vehicle exclusively to support that group by 
moving personnel from the BLZ to the group’s mission site by the most direct route.     
5) Use helicopters exclusively to effect movement of the group associated with 
the most distant mission site from the T-AH subject to group size being less than 40.  Do 
not use helicopters for any other purpose.   
6) Conclude operations at mission sites and commence ground transportation for 
return to BLZ at a time which allows each group to return to the BLZ one hour before 
group's desired arrival time at the T-AH.     
7) Wait until personnel from all groups have reached the BLZ before beginning 
transportation to the T-AH by watercraft.  Do not stage watercraft at the BLZ (unless that 
is their native starting position) in advance of personnel arriving there.   
An algorithm adhering to the above outline has been implemented and used to 
generate schedules corresponding to the three generic scenarios described in Section C.  
In the manually generated schedules, we find a total of 24 hours and 40 minutes of 
helicopter flight time is utilized (totaled from one instance of each scenario).     
2. Comparison of Individual Pseudo-Manual and Optimized Schedules  
Optimized schedules are produced utilizing the T-AH HAT model 
implementation for the three scenarios.  In order to match the flight hours used in the 
optimal schedules to those used in the manually generated schedules, the iterative method 
of helicopter variable cost adjustment is utilized, in this case to reach a like amount of 
helicopter utilization in the optimized schedule comparable to the corresponding manual 
schedule.  That is, we iterate helicopter costs for each individual scenario, independent of 
the other scenarios. In the next section we will find and apply a single helicopter cost 
across all three scenarios that, in aggregate across all scenarios, leads to the same amount 
of total utilization corresponding to the manual schedules. 
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For Scenario 1, a T-AH HAT optimized schedule is generated with 5 hours and 
10 minutes of helicopter flight time, appropriate for comparison to the corresponding 
pseudo-manual schedule that used 5 hours and 20 minutes correspondingly.  A 
comparison across many relevant criteria of the Scenario 1 pseudo-manual and optimized 
schedules is shown in Table 2.  We see the duration of fully manned operations at MS1 is 
reduced in the optimized schedule; this is because the pseudo-manual algorithm assigns 
helicopters to exclusively support this particular MS.  At the other three MSs, and 
overall, the duration of fully manned operations increases by 5 hours and 30 minutes 
(19% increase).  Although there is a decrease, in terms of percentage, in the number of 
partially manned hours, these hours are not as significant as the fully manned hours.  The 
9% improvement in total (fully and partially manned) hours is actually conservative 
because the partially manned hours are treated with proportionate weight in this statistic.  
MS4, which is given priority by the planner as described in Section C, enjoys a 31% 
improvement in fully manned time.  Regarding average personnel travel times, we again 
find that while performance decreases for MS1 in the optimized schedule, it is improved 
at all other MSs and overall.  
Table 2.   Scenario 1 Pseudo-Manual and T-AH HAT Optimized Results Comparison.  









Helicopter Per-Period Cost N/A 100 N/A 
Duration MS1 Fully Manned  9:50 7:00 (29%) 
Duration MS2 Fully Manned  5:20 7:10 34% 
Duration MS3 Fully Manned   5:00 8:50 77% 
Duration MS4 Fully Manned  4:20 5:40 31% 
Duration MS5 Fully Manned 4:20 5:40 31% 
Combined Hours Fully Manned  28:50 34:20 19% 










Combined Hours Full and Partially 
Manned 
34:00 37:00 9% 
Group 1 Average Travel Time 1:00 3:10 (217%) 
Group 2 Average Travel Time 4:51 2:19 52% 
Group 3 Average Travel Time  5:00 1:49 64% 
Group 4 Average Travel Time 6:20 5:16 17% 
Group 5 Average Travel Time 7:50 6:10 21% 
Combined Average Travel Time  5:08 3:31 31% 
Combined Average Wait Time  0:22 0:22 - 
Helicopter Flight Time  5:20 5:10 3% 
Average Transportation Asset Seat 
Utilization Rate  
 57% 45% (19%) 
 
Results of the Scenario 2 comparison are shown in Table 3.  Notable in the 
Scenario 2 results is that the helicopter flight time in the optimized schedule cannot be 
matched to the 8 hours and 40 minutes consumed in the manual schedule by adjusting 
per-period penalty costs ((VperiodCostv).  Even with the per-period penalty set to 1.00 for 
embarked helicopters (a level ensuring this cost will be dwarfed by other components of 
the objective function, but still sufficient to prevent vehicle wandering), the T-AH HAT 
optimization needs not to utilize more than 6 hours of helicopter flight time.  This 
indicates utilization of helicopters in the pseudo-manual schedule was gratuitously 
suboptimal.  As a consequence, the overall improvements seen, a 6% increase in fully 
manned MS hours and a 34% decrease in average personnel travel time, were achieved 
while simultaneously reducing helicopter flight hours by 31%.  The ability to avoid 
wasting flight hours of little of no marginal value in one problem will prove to be 
beneficial when we later consider reallocation of flight hours between problems.          
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Table 3.   Scenario 2 Pseudo-Manual and T-AH HAT Optimized Results Comparison. 









Helicopter Per-Period Cost N/A 1 N/A 
Duration MS1 Fully Manned  8:40 9:00 4% 
Duration MS2 Fully Manned  6:30 7:50 21% 
Duration MS3 Fully Manned   6:30 7:30 15% 
Duration MS4 Fully Manned  9:00 8:10 (9%) 
Combined Hours Fully Manned 30:40 32:30 6% 
Combined Hours Partially Manned 0:20 2:40 700% 
Combined Hours Full and Partially 
Manned 
31:00 35:10 13% 
Group 1 Average Travel Time  1:25 1:52 (32%) 
Group 2 Average Travel Time 3:10 1:48 43% 
Group 3 Average Travel Time  3:10 1:26 55% 
Group 4 Average Travel Time 4:30 2:00 56% 
Combined Average Travel Time  2:41 1:47 34% 
Combined Average Wait Time  0:16 0:18 (18%) 
Helicopter Flight Time  8:40 6:00 31% 
Average Transportation Asset Seat 
Utilization Rate  
 46% 60% 30% 
For Scenario 3, the most significant improvement occurs in the category of 
average personnel travel time, which decreases by 11% in our optimized schedules.  
Notably, the fully manned time at MS1, where the scenario indicates priority should be 
given to maximizing operating hours and is prioritized accordingly in the T-AH HAT 
objective function, realizes an 11% increase in fully manned hours (compared to only a 
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1% increase overall among MSs).  This may be an indication of the effectiveness of the 
model in prioritizing the movement of personnel bound for a particular MS, although we 
must recognize the dynamics of each particular scenario are also likely to have much 
influence over where optimization realizes its largest gains.       
Table 4.   Scenario 3 Pseudo-Manual and T-AH HAT Optimized Results Comparison. 




Optimized        




Helicopter Per-Period Cost N/A 110 N/A 
Duration MS1 Fully Manned 4:30 5:00 11% 
Duration MS2 Fully Manned  8:40 8:30 (2%) 
Duration MS3 Fully Manned  6:40 8:00 20% 
Duration MS4 Fully Manned  5:50 4:30 (23%) 
Combined Hours Fully Manned 25:40 26:00 1% 
Combined Hours Partially Manned 4:20 7:30 73% 
Combined Hours Full and Partially 
Manned 
30:00 33:30 12% 
Group 1 Average Travel Time 5:41 3:05 46% 
Group 2 Average Travel Time 1:50 2:06 (15%) 
Group 3 Average Travel Time 3:40 2:25 34% 
Group 4 Average Travel Time 1:20 4:03 (204%) 
Combined Average Travel Time 3:12 2:50 11% 
Combined Average Wait Time 0:25 0:31 (24%) 
Helicopter Flight Time 10:40 10:40 0% 
Average Transportation Asset Seat 
Utilization Rate  
48% 42% (13%) 
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3. Comparison of Pseudo-Manual and Optimized Schedules  
In the previous section, the benefit of a T-AH HAT optimized schedule was 
shown in three scenarios where in each case, the optimized schedule took advantage of a 
quantity of helicopter flight hours equal or nearly equal to what was used in the 
corresponding, manual schedule.  In this section, we find and apply a single helicopter 
marginal utilization cost (VperiodCostv) across all three scenarios that, in aggregate, lead 
to the same amount of total utilization corresponding to the manual schedules, but with a 
different distribution of hours among the optimized scenarios.  This is intended to 
demonstrate the marginal benefit of helicopter flight hours is not the same in every 
scenario, and an efficient allocation of flight hours should not be pro-rata nor allocated on 
the basis of exclusively supporting a single mission site (as is called for by the pseudo-
manual algorithm).   
Runs of T-AH HAT conducted to support the previous section, and some 
additional runs conducted as we iterate towards the desired amount of total utilization, 
yield a table of helicopter utilization penalties and associated quantity of flight hours 
shown in Table 5.  Complicating matters is the inelasticity of helicopter utilization to 
penalties in cases where the helicopter provides the only feasible or only realistic means 
to a mission site. 
From these, we see in Table 5 that a VperiodCostv of 40, applied to helicopters 
across all three problems, leads to the same amount of helicopter utilization, in aggregate, 
as was employed in the manual schedules. Comparing the VperiodCostv of 40 optimized 
schedules with the original optimized schedules (VperiodCostv of 100, 1, and 110 
respectively) we find additional performance improvements as depicted in Table 6.  This 
demonstrates that the utility of allocating flight hours among daily problems by this 
algorithm, instead of on a pro-rata or other arbitrary basis, is that flight hours are assigned 
based on where they will have the greatest impact in improving aggregate objective 




Table 5.   Helicopter utilization penalties and the associated quantity of flight hours, for 
three scenarios, iteratively explored in order to match aggregate flight hours 
across the scenarios’ optimized schedules to the aggregate flight hours derived 
from the pseudo-manual scheduling process. Durations expressed in 
hours:minutes format. 
 Flying Hours 
VperiodCostv for 
embarked helicopters 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Total 
Pseudo-Manual Schedule 5:20 8:40 10:40 24:40 
VperiodCostv  = 1  6:00   
VperiodCostv = 40 8:10 4:20 12:00 24:30 
VperiodCostv = 80 6:10  12:00  
VperiodCostv = 100 5:10  11:40  
VperiodCostv = 110   10:40  
VperiodCostv = 120 3:40 3:40 8:20 15:40 
 
Table 6.   Comparison of (1) pseudo-manual schedules, (2) T-AH HAT optimized schedules 
without reallocation of helicopter flight hours, and (3) T-AH HAT optimized 
schedules with flight hour reallocation among three scenarios. Durations 














from (2) to (3) 
(5) 
% improvement 
from (1) to (3) 
All Scenarios Total 
Combined Hours Fully 
Manned 
85:10 92:50 95:20 3% 12% 
All Scenarios Average 
Travel Time 
3:40 2:43 2:34 5% 26% 
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F.  ANALYSIS OF POTENTIAL T-AH MODIFICATIONS’ IMPACT ON 
MISSION PERFORMANCE  
The T-AH is an imperfect platform for Naval HA for reasons stated in Chapter I 
(although it should be noted there is no perfect platform for operations as dynamic as 
HA).  Nonetheless, it is the primary platform available for large-scale naval medical 
operations, and will likely remain so in the coming years.  For this reason, it is important 
to consider modifications to the platform that could mitigate its flaws when conducting 
HA.  Two potential modifications, both real and near-term possibilities, are the addition 
of a second flight deck landing spot and the addition of two 150-passenger patient tender 
watercraft.  To assess the impact of these potential modifications on mission 
performance, the primary criterion of hours of ashore mission site operation will be used.        
1. Analysis: T-AH Certified to Use Two Helicopter Landing Spots 
 The effect of having two vice one helicopter landing spots on the T-AH has been 
explored by relaxing constraint (2.7) regarding flight deck landing spots.  This relaxation 
allows up to two helicopters to be active on the flight deck at any given time.  We assume 
a helicopter shelter still exists, although scheduling a helicopter to move from flight deck 
to shelter may now be driven by the optimized schedule only if more than two helicopters 
are involved in the scenario.  
A comparison is conducted over three scenarios of optimized schedules with and 
without the addition of a second landing spot.  For each comparison, the utilization of 
helicopter flight hours is made nearly equal between the with and without second landing 
spot optimized schedules (21 hours and 21 hours and 50 minutes, respectively) by the 
iterative technique so a like comparison can be made.  We find that the combined (all 
mission sites) hours of fully manned operations increase by 4% with the addition of a 
second landing spot, despite utilizing slightly fewer aggregate flight hours (see Table 7).   
Relating this improvement to the general allocation of flight hours, we calculate 
(without any statistical certainty due to the small sample size) a rough estimate of the 
ratio of additional operating hours ashore to flight hours utilized by adding a second 
landing spot is 4 (additional operating hours) / 21 (flight hours) = 0.19.  That is, a 
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decision maker evaluating the prospect of adding a second landing spot might consider 
the benefit in terms of the number of flight hours of operation expected in a given 
deployment, and then use this ratio to estimate, for example, that a deployment 
consuming 400 flight hours would gain an additional 0.19 × 400 = 76 hours of ashore 
mission site operations if a second landing spot were added.       
Table 7.   Comparison of optimized schedules with and without the addition of a second 









All Scenarios Helicopter Flight Time 21:50 21:00 4% 
All Scenarios Total Combined Hours Fully Manned 92:50 96:50 4% 
 
2. Analysis: T-AH Modified to Carry Two Patient Tender Watercraft 
The effect of adding two patient tender watercraft to the T-AH, deployable by a 
boat davit system, has been explored by adding representations of such vehicles to the 
scenarios introduced earlier in the chapter, and by relaxing constraint (2.8) regarding 
watercraft docking to reflect the boat davits’ capability to launch and recover watercraft.  
We assume the boat davits may be operated independently, and do not interfere with the 
docking of other watercraft alongside the T-AH in the current fashion.  Besides relaxing 
constraint (2.8), it is also noted that boat davit deployable watercraft would address an 
issue, not represented in our model, with safely embarking and debarking patients and 
personnel from the T-AH in conditions when having them leap from a watercraft into the 
T-AH’s loading bay (the current practice) becomes harrowing.   
In Table 8, we see a comparison over three scenarios of optimized schedules with 
and without the addition of patient tender watercraft.  For each comparison, the 
utilization of helicopter flight hours has been made nearly equal between the with and 
without patient tender watercraft optimized schedules by the iterative technique.  We find 
 53
that the combined (all mission sites) hours of fully manned operation increase by 10% 
with the addition of two patient tender watercraft.  Simultaneously, helicopter utilization 
decreases by 10% in this comparison, and by comparing Table 7 and Table 8 results, we 
see that the addition of patient tender watercraft leads, in this case, to a dramatic 40% 
reduction in helicopter utilization compared to optimized schedules where helicopters 
necessarily played a larger role in problem solution.                
 
Table 8.   Comparison of optimized schedules with and without the addition of patient 
tender watercraft, over three scenarios. Durations expressed in hours:minutes 









All Scenarios Helicopter Flight Time 14:20 12:40 10% 
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IV. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
A.  CONCLUSION 
This thesis demonstrates the application of mathematical optimization to T-AH 
HA operations.  By addressing the Transportation Problem (one of many defined 
problems associated with T-AH HA), we show how the efficiency of HA operations may 
be increased.   
Even small increases in efficiency must be viewed against the scale of a T-AH 
HA deployment; USNS COMFORT treated nearly 95,000 patients over the course of 
four months in 2007.  Optimal transportation schedules guided by the T-AH HAT model, 
regardless of the case-specific percentage of improvement, can translate into thousands 
more patients treated (or lives saved in a DR mission).  By extension, these additional 
patients treated (or other HA provided if the service is non-medical) equate to additional 
mission accomplishment, as we are able to further the favorable impression of the U.S. 
conveyed by HA.  In particular, our optimized schedules improve average duration of 
ashore mission site operations by between 9% and 13% in three scenarios, compared to a 
set of pseudo-manually generated schedules.   
We have also used T-AH HAT to quantify the benefit of potential modifications 
to the T-AH class.  Analysis conducted with three sample scenarios has demonstrated that 
certification of a second flight deck landing spot on the T-AH may yield a 4% increase in 
ashore mission site fully manned operational time, while the addition of two patient 
tender watercraft may yield a 10% increase (over already optimized schedules in both 
cases).     
 The U.S. Navy currently has at least one T-AH HA deployment scheduled per 
year through 2012.  Additional deployments are possible, particularly in response to 
natural disaster.  This means that the Navy’s institutional experience in T-AH HA will 
more than double in the next five years.  In support of this new core capability for U.S. 
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Naval forces, it is necessary and appropriate that robust analysis efforts complement the 
gain in practical operational experience as HA capabilities mature.   
B.  DEPLOYMENT OF THE OPTIMIZATION TOOL 
USNS MERCY is expected to commence an HA deployment in the summer of 
2008.  Destroyer Squadron (DESRON) 31, based in Pearl Harbor, has been selected to 
command the mission.  This thesis will be distributed to DESRON 31 upon completion 
for consideration of fielding an implementation of the T-AH HAT model in conjunction 
with their deployment.  A preliminary description of T-AH HAT has already been 
circulated among parties responsible for planning the MERCY deployment, including the 
U.S. Pacific Fleet (PACFLT) and personnel aboard the hospital ship itself.        
Challenges to deploying an implementation of T-AH HAT are twofold.  First, a 
license for the proprietary software owned by Dash Optimization, the developer of 
Xpress-MP, would need to be arranged.  It is assumed the implementation of T-AH HAT 
would reside on a stand-alone laptop rather than the T-AH’s network.  Second, some 
amount of training would have to be conducted with the planning officer responsible for 
the SSTP.  While an in-depth understanding of mathematical optimization would not be 
required of this individual, he or she would need to become comfortable with the 
conception of minimizing cost in the objective function.  Because this individual is 
already faced with the practical constraints modeled in T-AH HAT, and has the same 
objectives as those in the model’s objective function, he or she will already have an 
intuitive understanding of the model and should be able to make successful use of it after 
a brief period of familiarization.  Familiarization could be facilitated by NPS personnel in 
person (ideally) or remotely.             
C.  DISSEMINATION OF ANALYSIS 
An overview of this thesis work has also been shared with key individuals 
responsible for the T-AH class.  A personal briefing was delivered by the researcher to 
Mr. J. Kaskin, the Director, Strategic Mobility & Combat Logistics Division, Office of 
the Chief of Naval Operations (N-42).  Mr. Kaskin has responsibility for all Military 
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Sealift Command ships, which includes both MERCY and COMFORT.  This thesis work 
has also been informed by discussions with Mr. J. Zarkowsky, the Director for Future 
Deployable Platforms at the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery (BUMED), who will be on 
distribution for this thesis in hopes that he may, in turn, be informed by the results and 
analysis in the context of decisions regarding potential future utilization of, and 
modifications to, the T-AH class.                        
D.  RELATED TOPICS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Among the many other compelling T-AH HA Operations Research topics not 
addressed by thesis, several deserve particular emphasis for future research.  In the course 
of briefing this thesis to Mr. J. Kaskin, N-42 on the Navy Staff, interest in a comparative 
analysis of naval HA performed by a T-AH versus an amphibious assault ship was 
expressed.  Interestingly, the amphibious assault ship USS PELILEU conducted an HA 
mission in the Pacific during 2007, providing a case in point for comparison with T-AH 
HA.  It is tempting to assume ship-to-shore transportation constraints would not be a 
factor when utilizing a ship designed to move people quickly ashore from her flight deck 
and well deck, but this is not necessarily the case.  Because preparing the ship to launch 
or recover a landing craft from her well deck is a complex process, PELILEU generally 
only made use of her landing craft for one round trip per day, moving a single large wave 
of people out in the morning and back in the evening.  The prospect of waves of 
helicopters flying from PELILEU’s large flight deck is enticing, however, only two MH-
53 helicopters were embarked during most of the mission.  These were found by some to 
be insufficiently flexible and reliable to affect the scheduled and emergent movement of 
personnel and patients between ship and shore during the day.  Even if ship-to-shore 
transportation became un-constraining to an amphibious assault ship engaged in HA, 
other important criteria for comparison would be the T-AH’s non-combatant status, 
differences in the number of operating rooms and overall medical capacity, cost, and 
opportunity cost of committing either platform to HA at the expense of their availability 
to operate elsewhere and in other capacities.  
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Two other compelling operational topics are the concept of operations for the 
ashore mission sites (which are dynamic, unique, and involve queuing and optimization 
issues) and definition and inventory management of a customized allowance list of 
pharmaceuticals appropriate to T-AH HA.  Interest in these topics has been expressed by 
COMFORT medical operations department personnel and Bureau of Medicine and 
Surgery personnel, respectively.  An opportunity to observe ashore mission site 
operations would be critical to anyone developing the first topic.  Some familiarity with 
pharmaceutical allowances, or a partnership with an individual or organization with such 
familiarity, would be necessary for the second topic. 
At the strategic level of HA mission planning, critical planning decisions 
involving the selection of countries as HA recipients and duration of T-AH stay in each 
operating area could be informed by Operations Research analysis.  Analysis in this area 
could leverage past research into naval mission planning and scheduling, taking into 
account criteria unique to HA.  Also compelling would be a modeling of the personnel 
assignment process that draws specialized medical personnel from their parent commands 
to the T-AH for an HA deployment, with consideration of the possibly unique mix of 
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